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This article examines the evolution of retail sweep programs at banks throughout the 
Seventh Federal Reserve District. Such programs help banks reduce their reserve  
requirements, freeing up funds for investment.
The U.S. Federal Reserve System im-
poses reserve requirements on banks 
and other depository institutions.1 Re-
serve requirements perform a critical 
support function in the financial system. 
They help ensure a stable, predictable 
demand for reserves,2 which in turn 
enables the Federal Reserve to achieve 
policy objectives by controlling the supply 
of reserves.3 However, this comes at a 
cost. If banks do not have enough cash 
in their vaults to satisfy reserve require-
ments, calculated as a percentage of 
specified deposit liabilities, they must 
hold additional non-interest-bearing 
reserves on deposit at the Federal Reserve. 
As such, reserve requirements represent 
an implicit tax on deposits, since funds 
held to satisfy these requirements cannot 
be allocated to interest-bearing assets.
To offset the drain on profitability 
caused by reserve requirements, many 
banks have adopted retail sweep pro-
grams. These programs allow banks to 
transfer, or “sweep,” funds from deposit 
accounts that are subject to reserve re-
quirements into accounts that are not; 
this reduces the institution’s reserve re-
quirement. This reduction is of partic-
ular interest to banks that do not have 
sufficient vault cash to satisfy their reserve 
requirements. For these banks, lowering 
reserve requirements through sweep 
activity reduces the amount that must 
be held idle in Fed accounts, thereby 
increasing the amount of funds avail-
able for the banks to invest in interest-
earning assets. 
Retail sweep programs were first imple-
mented in January 1994.4 Since then, 
these programs have had a major im-
pact on reserve balances. In this Chicago 
Fed Letter, we explore the evolution of 
retail sweep programs at banks in the 
Seventh Federal Reserve District.5 
The mechanics 
Retail sweep programs are permissible 
if they comply with the Federal Reserve’s 
Regulation D (Reserve Requirements of 
Depository Institutions).6 These programs 
restructure transaction accounts into 
two legally separate accounts: a checking 
(transaction) account—i.e., a negotia-
ble order of withdrawal (NOW) account 
or demand deposit account—and a  
savings (nontransaction) account—i.e.,  
a savings deposit account or money mar-
ket deposit account (MMDA). Banks 
determine maximum and minimum 
threshold balances based on the amount 
of funds routinely used to pay debits 
during a typical statement cycle for each 
individual personal or nonpersonal ac-
count selected to be part of the sweep 
program. The amount in excess of the 
maximum threshold is then swept out 
of the checking account and into the 
savings account, which is not subject to 
reserve requirements. 
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To offset the drain on  
profitability caused by  
reserve requirements,  
many banks have adopted 
retail sweep programs.Sweep activity does not affect account 
holder liquidity; customers have access to 
their funds at all times. Debits and cred-
its are posted directly to the checking 
account. If this activity should exceed the 
minimum balance in this account, trans-
fers from the savings account would fund 
the shortfall. Regulation D, however, 
limits the number of transfers between 
accounts within (monthly) statement 
cycles. On the sixth transfer, the entire 
remaining balance in the savings account 
is swept back to the checking account 
where it remains until the end of the 
statement cycle. The entire sweep process, 
as described here, is then reset at the 
beginning of the next statement cycle. 
While this activity is transparent to the 
account holder, banks must ensure that 
customer account agreements have been 
amended under applicable contract law 
to provide for the existence of two distinct 
accounts rather than a single account. 
These programs are quite different from 
their 1970s predecessors: automatic 
transfer services (ATS) and wholesale 
sweep programs. Automatic transfer 
services allow banks to transfer funds 
automatically from a savings account 
to a checking account to cover a check 
or maintain a minimum balance. These 
arrangements differ from retail sweep 
programs in that they offer a direct ben-
efit to the customer, who earns interest 
on funds until they are needed. In a 
retail sweep program, the two-account 
structure appears to be one single check-
ing account, yielding one rate of interest. 
In most cases, only the savings account 
balances that are tied to interest-bearing 
checking accounts will earn interest.
Wholesale sweep programs typically trans-
fer funds from business demand deposit 
accounts into investment instruments 
that are not subject to reserve require-
ments. Like automatic transfer services, 
wholesale sweep programs also allow 
customers to earn interest on funds 
that are effectively equivalent to demand 
deposits.7 Some of the more common 
investments used in wholesale sweep 
programs are repurchase agreements, 
offshore Eurodollar deposits, and mutual 
funds. In contrast to retail sweep funds, 
wholesale sweep funds may actually be 
swept off the books and into instruments 
that are not liabilities of the bank. 
Reserve requirements 
Sweep activity is reflected on a bank’s re-
port of deposits (i.e., its official report 
of transaction accounts, other deposits, 
and vault cash to the Federal Reserve).8 
This report is the primary input for the 
calculation of reserve requirements and 
the construction of the monetary and 
reserves aggregates used in the formu-
lation of monetary policy. 
Reserve requirements are assessed on 
net transaction accounts, calculated as 
total transaction accounts less demand 
balances due from banks in the U.S. 
and cash items in process of collection. 
Reserve ratios are prescribed for all 
banks, banking Edge and agreement 
corporations,9 and U.S. branches and 
agencies of foreign banks in a range of 
0% to 10%, depending on the value of net 
transactions—0% up to the exemption 
amount, 3% from the exemption amount 
to the low reserve tranche, and 10% on 
amounts above the low reserve tranche.  
For 2008, the exemption amount is 
$9.3 million and the low reserve tranche 
is $43.9 million.
Seventh District analysis 
The Federal Reserve Board has monitored 
the volume of funds swept since 1994. 
These data consist of sweep balance in-
formation obtained at the implementa-
tion of an institution’s sweep program 
and subsequent updates, which occur 
infrequently. Updates are typically trig-
gered by isolated events such as mergers 
and large, uncharacteristic data fluctua-
tions related to new sweep activity. The 
expansions of existing sweep programs 
can sometimes be difficult to track, since 
they can be phased in over time in small 
increments. Two years ago, we conducted 
a survey to help measure the volume of 
sweep activity in the Seventh District as 
of June 30, 2006. We compared our 2006 
survey data with those of the Federal 
Reserve Board.
Of a total of 1,462 institutions we surveyed, 
76.5%, or 1,118 banks, responded. We 
found that the number of banks using 
retail sweep programs had risen signifi-
cantly; this increased usage along with 
growth in the deposit base had caused 
aggregate sweep volume to soar. In 1995, 
only 39 Seventh District institutions used 
these programs, sweeping a modest 
$2.0 billion. By mid-2006, the number of 
sweepers had grown over sixfold to 250; 
and the volume of funds swept had in-
creased exponentially, to a total of 
$105.3 billion.10 During this time, our sam-
ple deposit base experienced an aver-
age annual increase of 4%, rising to 
$670.3 billion. Still, 77.6% of Seventh 
District institutions had yet to imple-
ment such programs at the time of the 
2006 survey.
Figure 1 illustrates that the volume of 
funds swept in 2006 was primarily be-
ing driven by the 12 largest institutions 
in the Seventh District. The remaining 
portion is closely distributed between 
small and mid-size entities. 
Profitability provides banks with a pow-
erful incentive to reduce non-interest-
bearing balances held at the Federal 
Reserve. The impact of sweep pro-
grams is reflected in a marked decline 
in Seventh District reserve requirements. 
In 2006, reserve requirements were 
$3.5 billion—a 41.7% reduction from 
$6.0 billion in 1995. Although a number 
of factors contributed to this decline, 
including merger activity and adjust-
ments in exemption and tranche levels 
1. Stratification of sweep institutions in the Seventh District, 2006
  Asset size distribution
  Less than  $1 billion –  Greater than
  $1 billion  $10 billion  $10 billion  Total
Number of institutions  180  58  12  250
Sweep volume (in $ millions)
  Non-interest-bearing accounts   12,779  7,732  44,914  65,425
  Interest-bearing accounts  6,736  9,060  24,121  39,917
  Total  19,515  16,792  69,035  105,342 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.for calculating reserve requirements, 
the significant volume of sweep activity 
that took place over this period clearly 
makes it one of the primary drivers. In 
fact, 189 of the 250 institutions that en-
gaged in sweep activity in 2006 were able 
to satisfy their reserve requirements with 
vault cash alone. For these institutions, 
reserve requirements were virtually 
costless, given that they were already 
holding vault cash for the purpose of 
meeting customer demand.
Despite the decline in reserve require-
ments, institutions must continue to 
maintain balances in Federal Reserve 
accounts to fund normal payments 
activity. To ensure sufficient coverage, 
many institutions have opted to redi-
rect funds toward contractual clearing 
balances. Unlike excess reserves (bal-
ances in excess of a bank’s reserve  
requirement), contractual clearing  
balances generate earnings credits that 
can be used to offset eligible Federal 
Reserve service charges. 
With the erosion of reserve require-
ments, contractual clearing balances 
have become increasingly important in 
the measurement of demand for reserves. 
From 1995 to 2006, contractual clearing 
balances in the U.S. rose 46.6%, from 
$4.8 billion to $7.1 billion. However, 
in the Seventh District, these balances 
actually decreased by $44.8 million, 
from $704.1 million to $659.3 million, 
over the same period, due to offsetting 
factors, such as 
mergers with banks 
in other Federal  
Reserve Districts.
To sweep or not to 
sweep
We know why sweep 
programs are appeal-
ing: They provide in-
stitutions with an 
opportunity to free up 
cash for investment 
by reducing or elimi-
nating required reserve 
balances (i.e., the por-
tion of their reserve 
requirements not sat-
isfied by vault cash). 
However, not all insti-
tutions have bought into the idea. To 
assess the impact of a bank’s decision not 
to sweep, we looked at one sample non-
sweeping bank in the Seventh District. 
This mid-size bank has been required to 
maintain reserves since 1998. Figure 2 
outlines the revenue the bank’s balances 
would have earned if they had been in-
vested in the overnight federal funds 
market from 1998 through 2006. This 
institution experienced significant de-
posit growth during this period as evi-
denced by the increase in required 
reserve balances. Despite the volatility in 
the federal funds rate, the opportunity 
cost of not sweeping generally rose over 
time. While the analysis presented in this 
scenario is oversimplified—e.g., we do not 
take into account the cost of implement-
ing and maintaining a sweep program—
it does illustrate the potential revenue 
loss associated with not sweeping. 
Conclusion
Retail sweep programs have experi-
enced tremendous growth not only on 
the Seventh District level but on a na-
tional level. Many banks have taken ad-
vantage of the opportunity to redirect 
funds formerly held to satisfy required 
reserve balances toward more reward-
ing alternatives, such as investment in 
money market instruments and/or 
clearing balance arrangements.  
The Financial Services Regulatory Relief 
Act of 2006 may slow the ongoing  
expansion of these programs. Signed 
into law on October 13, 2006, the act 
authorizes the payment of interest on 
Federal Reserve account balances effec-
tive October 1, 2011. Reducing the im-
pact of the implicit tax could motivate 
some sweepers to streamline their sweep 
activity in favor of earning interest on 
balances held in their Federal Reserve 
accounts. Also, we may begin to observe 
an alteration in the number of banks 
implementing or maintaining sweep 
programs. When the payment of interest 
on reserve balances becomes effective, 
there will be less of an incentive for 
banks to invest in such reserve avoid-
ance schemes.11 The extent of this re-
sponse will depend on the specific 
payment structure offered through 
this legislation. 
1 Hereafter in this article, we use the 
term “banks” as shorthand for banks 
and other depository institutions that 
are subject to reserve requirements.  
We thank David Tucker, credit analyst, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, for 
his contributions to this article. 
2 Demand for reserves refers to the sum 
of required reserve balances, contractual 
clearing balances, and excess reserve 
balances.
3 Joshua N. Feinman, 1993, “Reserve re-
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2. Opportunity cost of not sweeping, 1998–2006 
  Required 
  reserve balances  Annual federal  Annual return 
Year  ($ thousands)  funds rate (%)  ($ thousands)
1998  169.5  5.35  9.1
1999  178.2  4.97  8.9
2000  269.0  6.24  16.8
2001  402.0  3.88  15.6
2002  1,568.9  1.67  26.2
2003  3,035.1  1.13  34.3
2004  5,215.7  1.35  70.4
2005  7,126.6  3.22  229.5
2006  7,360.0  4.97  365.8 
 
NoteS: The values here are for one sample nonsweeping bank in the Seventh District.  
Required reserve balances are the portion of a bank's reserve requirement not satisfied  
by vault cash. The annual federal funds rate refers to the annualized, daily effective federal 
funds rate derived from a weighted average of rates on brokered trades. Rates were obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 statistical release.
SourceS: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago  
and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, reports of transaction accounts,  
other deposits, and vault cash; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,  
“Selected interest rates,” statistical release, No. H.15.potential reform,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
Board of Governors of the Federal  
Reserve System, June, pp. 569–589.
4 C. L. Edwards, 1997, “Open market 
operations in the 1990s,” Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, November, 
pp. 859–874.
5 The Seventh Federal Reserve District 
comprises all of Iowa and most of Illinois, 
Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
6  For details, see www.federalreserve.gov/ 
Regulations/#d.
7 Donald L. Kohn, 2003, “Business 
Checking Freedom Act of 2003, H. R. 
758 and H. R. 859,” testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions 
and Consumer Credit, Committee on 
Financial Services, U.S. House of  




8 See www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/ 
ReportDetail.cfm?WhichFormID= 
FR_2900cb.
9 Both Edge and agreement corporations 
are organizations chartered by the  
Federal Reserve to engage in international 
banking and financial operations. 
10 The actual increase in the number of 
sweepers and the volume of funds swept 
between 1995 and 2006 is likely to be 
smaller because of differences in deriving 
these figures in those years.
11 Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S.  
Bernanke recently requested Congress 
to permit the payment of interest on  
reserves effective immediately.